


CHAPTER V
THE WHITE RIVER EXPEDITION, 1887

COLOROW'S DEPREDACTIONS IN THE WHITE RIVER COUNTRY—
SHERIFF KENDALL'S DIFFICULTIES WITH THE UTES—RUMORS
OF WAR—COLORADO NATIONAL GUARD ORDERED TO GAR-
FIELD COUNTY—CAMP AT MEEKER—PURSUIT OF THE INDIANS
—FIGHT AT RANGELY—RETURN TO MEEKER—END OF THE
CAMPAIGN—TROOPS RETURN TO HOME STATIONS.

The last conflict with the Indians on Colorado soil took place during the late summer of 1887, and in the course of the campaign, short as it was, the Colorado National Guard had many opportunities of proving its mettle and efficiency. However, to intelligently comprehend the events of the campaign, it is necessary to advert briefly to the tragedy of 1879, when Major Thornburgh with his command was ambushed at Milk Creek by the Utes under Captain Jack, and to the subsequent massacre of Agent Meeker and his employees, events which resulted in the removal of the White River and Uncompahgre Utes from Colorado to the Uintah Reservation in Utah. Colorow, a sub-chief, and his small band of followers were never reconciled to the change, but they were compelled to accompany the others nevertheless, and were taken across the border despite their remonstrances. The surrender of the White River Country by the Utes in accordance with an act of Congress was full and complete, and no reservation was made of hunting privileges or rights of any



COLOROW
(From a photograph in the C. S. Stobie
collection.)

kind. Settlers began to pour into the country, the town of Meeker was established near the site of the old agency, and in time the valley of the White River became fairly well covered with farms and ranches. The Utes, as a whole, accepted the new order of things, and remained on their reservations. However, Colorow, a disreputable, cowardly old rascal who was disliked by most of his own people and detested by the whites, with a small following finally drifted back into Colorado and for a time avoided trouble with the settlers. This rather uncertain state of affairs, in the very nature of things, could not last for long and Colorow and his band soon began to inflict petty annoyances on the settlers. As time went on they became more arrogant. Stock was stolen and killed and crops destroyed. Women were frightened and bullied into feeding

the old reprobate and his band by threats of instant death if they refused. The settlers in the more isolated sections of the valley were subjected to his bulldozing tactics and boastful threats to such an extent that a feeling of alarm soon became manifest. The bloody days of 1879 were still a poignant memory in this section of the state and, to quote Governor Adams, "As these Indians were the identical savages who had participated in the Meeker outrages, and amid the very scenes that had witnessed the dying agonies of their victims, they (the settlers) would have been more than human had they not been haunted with fear and anxiety." Such, then, was the prologue to the troubles with the Utes in 1887.

The immediate cause of the outbreak is somewhat obscure, but as near as can be ascertained, two members of Colorow's band, Shevalo and Uintah (Big) Frank, it is alleged, stole two horses from a white man named Lem Hammond living near Rangely, and, with a lot of other horses, sold them to George Toedt and J. M. Woods of Meeker. As soon as Toedt and Woods found the horses were stolen they turned them over to Hammond and made the Indians replace the stolen stock with horses out of their band. The Indians were subsequently indicted by the grand jury of Garfield County for horse stealing, and warrants for their arrest placed in the hands of Sheriff J. C. Kendall for service. Kendall gathered a strong posse, rode into Colorow's camp, and endeavored to arrest the offending Indians. He was met with determined opposition, and threats and war-like demonstrations ensued on both sides. Accidentally or otherwise a gun was discharged, and Kendall's men immediately opened fire on the Indians. Several shots were exchanged, and the Indians finally retreated and disappeared in the mountains. There is no doubt that Kendall lacked proper discretion in the discharge of his duty, and his rough-shod methods had much to do with precipitating the outbreak. To quote from Hall:

"Rumors of war spread on every side, reaching all towns and ranches, causing general excitement and alarm among the settlers who discovered in these proceedings the beginnings of a general massacre. A thousand exciting tales were told; all the dreadful particulars of the slaughter of Agent Meeker and his employees in 1879, with the seizure and inhuman treatment of the women then made captives, were rehearsed over and over again until a universal panic was created. The ranchmen hurried their families out of their homes into the principal town, and put guards about them. Demands for immediate assistance were made upon the Governor, who reported the matter to the authorities at Washington, and to the commander of this military department, asking that Colorow and his Indians be compelled to return to their reservation. Had these appeals been rightly considered and promptly acted upon, the entire difficulty could have been adjusted in twenty hours without the loss of life or property. But, as usual, action was not taken until too late, when measureless censure was visited upon the Governor and the militia of the State, for taking the matter into their own hands. It is an old story; the records of Colorado are full of similar cases."

Governor Adams in his introduction to the report of the Adjutant General says: "So alarming became the reports, so urgent the demands for assistance from the officials and citizens of Garfield County, so imperative seemed the necessity of State aid to enforce the law and protect citizens and property, in the opinion of the Adjutant General, and others in whom I had confidence, that it seemed my clear and bounden duty to use the power of the State to sustain the majesty of the law, and prevent the massacre of settlers

in the White and Bear River country, which would no doubt have been the result of Sheriff Kendall's campaign had not the State sent troops to enforce peace and protect the people."

The Governor was, in fact, literally swamped with telegrams, letters and petitions, an example of which follows:

Glenwood Springs, Colorado,
August 11, 1887.


To Governor Adams:

The White River Utes are in force above Meeker. Have fired on the citizens, and sent runners to Uintah Agency for war party. Colorow at the head of the Utes. Citizens abandoning ranches and concentrating at Meeker. Can't you help us, and also have the Government troops at Uintah put in motion? We especially need arms and ammunition. Glenwood our nearest telegraphic point. Answer to Jo. Reynolds. Chairman of County Commissioners.

(Signed) W. H. Clark, Mayor of Meeker,
A. J. Gregory, County Commissioner,
L. B. Brasher, Sec'y Stock Growers Ass'n.

This dispatch was telegraphed by the Governor to the Secretary of War with request for reply. No direct reply was made, but later a telegram was received from Brigadier General George Crook commanding the Department

of the Platte to the effect that; "Federal troops could not be used to assist State authorities in execution of civil process without orders from the President." These orders not forthcoming, and the Federal authorities manifesting a rather indifferent attitude, Governor Adams was compelled to adopt immediate and decisive measures. Regardless of his private opinion of Sheriff Kendall's precipitate and unwarranted action, dread of possible Indian retaliation had seized the settlers of the White River country and they demanded protection. This, the Governor was constrained to grant, and, to quote him again: "My conception of a State's obligation to its people is that, when necessary, it should utilize every resource, every element of strength with which it is dowered, to protect even its humblest or most remote citizen. There should be no spot in Colorado where the life of a peaceful citizen is not secure or where his property is not safe."



BRIG. GEN. GEORGE WEST
Adjutant General of Colorado
—1887-1889. (Captain Co. F,
2nd Colo. Cav. Vol's.
1863-1865).

Adjutant General West was at once sent to Glenwood Springs to investigate the matter and report his findings direct to the Governor. After making an estimate of the situation at the scene of the disturbance General West decided, perhaps mistakenly, that war with the Utes was inevitable and

at the importunity of all the county and town officials of Garfield County, recommended that the State troops be ordered to Meeker at once.

The troops called out for service under command of Brigadier General F. M. Reardon, 1st Brigade, Colorado National Guard, were as follows:¹

First Battalion of Cavalry, Colo. N. G.—Major Gavin Leslie, Commanding.

Troop A, Colorado Springs—Captain Wm. Saxton. (Three officers and 28 enlisted men.)

Troop B, Leadville—Captain Francis Rose. (Three officers and 58 enlisted men.)

Troop C, Denver—Captain Geo. W. Lawson. (Three officers and 28 enlisted men.)

Company H, 2nd Infantry, Colo. N. G., (Mounted), Canon City—Captain I. R. French. (Three officers and 41 enlisted men.)

Company F, 1st Infantry, Colo. N. G., (Aspen Infantry Company), Aspen—Captain J. H. Gosline. (Three officers and 45 enlisted men).²

Troop C left Denver at 8:30 P. M. August 16, 1887, was joined by Troop A at Colorado Springs and Company H at Canon City enroute, all three units arriving at Gypsum, at that time the furthest point west on the Denver and Rio Grande Railway, at 3:00 A. M. August 18th. Troop B from Leadville had arrived at Gypsum at 8:30 P. M. the previous day. Major Leslie was directed to move forward with Troop B at 6:00 A. M. the 18th, and establish camp at Glenwood Springs, a distance of thirty-eight miles from Gypsum; the remainder of the troops, with the exception of a detail of twenty men from Company H which was left at Gypsum, were to follow as soon as practicable. Starting in advance, Brigadier General Reardon arrived at Glenwood Springs at 3:30 P. M., August 18th, the main body of the troops arriving at 7:00 P. M. the same day.

The troops bivouacked at Glenwood Springs the night of the 18th and the following day was spent in perfecting arrangements to continue the march to Meeker.

“Boots and saddles” was sounded at 1:30 A. M., August 20, and the command, excepting a small number that could not be mounted, took up the march to Rifle Creek, twenty-seven miles from Glenwood Springs where they camped the night of the twentieth. On the 21st the march was continued to Morgan’s ranch, eighteen miles north of Rifle Creek, and the following day, August 22, 1887, the command reached Meeker at 3 o’clock P. M., a distance of twenty-two miles from Morgan’s ranch.

General Reardon established his headquarters in Meeker on the 22nd of August where he was joined by Brigadier General George West, the Adjutant General, late on the same day, the troops meantime going into camp close to the town limits. Here all officers and men were made acquainted with the Governor’s instructions to the Adjutant General which were, in part, as follows:

¹ Two additional companies were organized on August 24, 1887, for service during the emergency. They were commanded by Captains J. D. Hooper and W. F. Dendy, respectively, and were mustered out at the conclusion of the campaign. Total of the two companies about 68 officers and men.

² This company reported for duty at Meeker on Aug. 22, 1887.

"I wish to caution you to act upon facts and not upon rumors. Remember that you are there to enforce civil law and to protect the citizens of Colorado, and to do these things you will use every power at your command. But you must be careful that your power is not used to assail Indians unjustly or to gratify the desire of those who want an Indian war, whether right or wrong. Your duty is to preserve peace, to protect lives and property, and not to conduct an indiscriminate war of extermination against the Indians. Where an Indian has invaded the rights of a citizen of the State or broken the law, it is your duty to aid the Sheriff in bringing him to account, but where no law has been violated, it is beyond our province to punish. * * * You must act with great judgment and discretion. A mistake upon your part would result in serious cost of life and money. Do not let advisors who want war without regard to cause or consequences lead you to do that which *cold facts* will not warrant. No matter what our feelings may be against the Indians, we must do no injury that the acts and conduct of the Indians do not justify."

During this time Sheriff Kendall and his posse of cowboys were ranging through the country to the north of Meeker in search of the Indians, but apparently without much success. On the 22nd, Major J. L. Pritchard, Chief of Scouts, who had previously reported to General Reardon with his company of scouts, was directed to establish his headquarters near Meeker, to divide his force, sending one party north to find Sheriff Kendall, and the other south and west along the White River valley, to ascertain the movements of the Indians. The scouts departed on their missions, and later the same day word was received from Kendall as follows:

General West:

Dear Sir:—If you will send one hundred men to cut off the Utes below and send them back this way, I will take care of them on this end of the trail. If you make a forced march to Blue Mountain you can cut them off sure. I am on their trail here. Would come down and see you, but if I do everything will stop here.

Yours truly,
J. C. Kendall.

In response to Kendall's request the following order was issued:

Headquarters First Brigade, Colo. N. G.
Camp Meeker, August 23, 1887.

General Orders }
No. 8 }

Major Leslie will proceed with three (3) troops of cavalry, under his command, under such personal instructions as he may receive from the commanding general. His objective point will be Blue Mountain.

By command of

Brigadier-General Reardon.

J. H. Hammond,

Major, and Assistant Adjutant-General.

The additional instructions Major Leslie received from General Reardon were to proceed to Blue Mountain, and there hold such Indians as he found until the arrival of the sheriff, which would probably be within forty-eight hours. If he could find the individual Indians named in warrants then given him, he was to arrest them and deliver them to Sheriff Kendall. Emphati-

cally, he was directed to not quarrel, or to fight unless forced to do so in self defense. If a fight was forced on him before the arrival of Sheriff Kendall he was to drive the Indians to the reservation and then guard its eastern line pending the arrival of the sheriff. On the appearance of the sheriff, his (Kendall's) orders were to be observed in all lawful matters.

Major Leslie left the camp at Meeker at 11:00 A. M. August 23, with an effective force of 84 officers and enlisted men and two guides, mounts not being available for the 100 men requested by Kendall. On the same day one John McAndrews, a herder on the Uintah Reservation, called on General Reardon and informed him that the Utes on the reservation were greatly excited and that Mr. Byrnes, the agent, feared that they would leave the reservation in a body to assist Colorow and his band. Adjutant General West was present when McAndrews made his report, and, in an effort to forestall any hostile move on the part of the reservation Indians, entrusted McAndrews with a "To whom it may concern" notice, excerpts from which are as follows:

"That the Indians are amenable to the laws the same as white men and no farther; that if they are arrested they will have the privileges of the law in all respects, and that if they think they can not have a fair trial in this county, they will have the privilege of change of venue to any other county, the same as the whites; that all promises to the Indians will be kept in good faith, to which the State of Colorado is hereby pledged. The Commanding General is ready at all times to receive parties for parley and will always do so under a flag of truce."

On the 24th Brigadier General Reardon received dispatches from Major Leslie and Captain Pray of Pritchard's scouts to the effect that they had encountered Colorow and his band near the mouth of Fox Creek, and that Captain Pray, after "Skirmishing for position," (whatever that may mean), had made a truce with the Indians and was holding them pending the arrival of reinforcements. According to Pray, in an interview with Colorow and other chiefs under flag of truce, the Indians expressed their demands as follows: "White man must go back as he (Colorow) now has reinforcements from the Uncompahgre reservation and can get more if he wants them. Me no afraid of soldiers. White man want little fight, Indian little fight too; white man want big fight, so Indians have big fight, too." Pray also stated in his dispatches, "There are no Indians north of this place. Colorow's band means fight on the drop of the hat, and he is quite ready to drop it himself. He showed me some of his warriors from the Uncompahgre. * * * They are all superbly mounted, and as well armed as we are. They are loaded with ammunition, and many of them have the most approved field glasses."

Major Leslie in his dispatches, reported having come up with the Indians at 7:00 A. M., August 24; that at eight o'clock they entered the Indian camp, the Indians leaving on the approach of the command, and that both sides now had flags of truce flying, and were awaiting reinforcements; further that the Indians had sent all their stock to the reservation, and that they wanted the soldiers to go no further.

General Reardon's reaction to the dispatches of Leslie and Pray is best expressed in his report to the Adjutant General at the conclusion of the campaign. He says:

"At 3:15 P. M., the twenty-fourth instant, I sent a dispatch to His Excellency, the Commander-in-Chief, requesting his presence in Glenwood

Springs, to meet yourself and County Commissioners Gregory and Reynolds, I deeming that an emergency existed requiring his presence.

"Acting upon the call for reinforcements, a volunteer force of fifty-three men, under Sheriff J. D. Hooper, was forwarded at 10:00 P. M., the twenty-fourth instant, after being mustered into the service by the Adjutant-General of Colorado, and thirteen men, under Captain Dendy, also volunteers and mustered into the service, left Meeker for the front at 11:00 o'clock P. M., the twenty-fourth instant.

"Dispatches were sent to Major Leslie notifying him of the reinforcements forwarded, and directing him to arrest any party or parties who attempted to obstruct his passage through Garfield county, in the performance of his duty in assisting Sheriff Kendall to serve process upon Indians for whom he had warrants."

Returning now to Major Leslie's command it was evident that events were fast approaching a climax. In order to present the story of the ensuing fight from both sides I shall quote first from Major Leslie's report to General Reardon, and then from the report of Brigadier General George Crook, U. S. army, commanding the Department of the Platte, which gives the Indian view of the affair. Starting then, at that point in Major Leslie's report subsequent to the sending of the dispatch to General Reardon as noted above:

"At the Ute camp a halt was called * * *.³ The troops at this time, 2:00 P. M., (August 24), killed a beef, and this, with water, made the first meal for thirty hours for my men; during the meal a hail storm such as few have ever seen, came up, and lasted an hour, badly chilling the horses and men. As soon as the hill on which the Utes were last seen was again sighted, nothing was in sight, and each man was promptly in his saddle and riding down the river, crossing the river at Stedman's ranch. There the rain again came down in torrents, and a halt was had for a few moments. Kendall's force was now seen riding at a gallop down the opposite side of the river and my command left at once to join him, overtaking him at McDowell's ranch. The scouts did not now accompany us, but remained at Stedman's ranch until morning; having had so much hard riding, and no forage, several horses were badly given out, and some forty men and mounts were left for the night at McDowell's ranch.

"The Kendall party, now numbering about thirty men, pushed down the river, and hard riding until 11:00 P. M., of the twenty-fourth brought us to Rangely, Colorado, on a hot trail. Here the guides were unacquainted with the country west, and a halt was ordered and hay procured for horses, and a few crackers bought for the men. At daybreak both Kendall's command and mine were at a full gallop on the trail of the night before. At 6:30 a Ute, known as Gus, rode up the mesa and tried to call a halt, but we kept right on down the river, and suddenly came upon a Ute camp with about twenty-five therein in sight. These took down the river, and after a short distance took to the bluffs and commenced firing. Eight of our rashest, but bravest men, charged down the valley, and here Lieutenant Folsom, of Aspen, Private Caffrey, of Leadville, Dr. Du Mont, of Glenwood, and Private Stewart were wounded, and three horses killed. Kendall's, and my remaining force then took to the high ground and had a running fight for its occupation. It was here that Jasper Ward, of Kendall's men, was killed.

³ The matter omitted here refers to Pray's parley with the Indians referred to in his dispatches as noted above.

"We drove the Indians from this position and not a coward is known among either command, and after general orders were given for position, it was every man for himself. Bullets were flying thick and fast around us, and both Kendall and myself have cause for congratulation in the possession of so many nervy men. Special mention is unnecessary, and all should receive commendation at the proper time. The Utes were constantly receiving reinforcements; they now numbered, according to experienced men about one hundred men, and were entirely around us, watching for reinforcements and detached men. Pray's party came up and had a skirmish, but no one hurt. This state of affairs lasted until noon when only stray shots were being fired at us; but the men and horses were all nearly famished, and my troops had been out forty-eight hours with only one piece of beef, and some of the men's crackers. It was necessary to at least get to water, and being surrounded as I was, the situation looked serious.

"At about noon a large body of men were seen and proved to be Hooper's party, with the men of Kendall's and my parties who were left at McDowell's ranch, numbering about seventy men, arrived, and such a shout as went up was heard for miles around.

"As this body came up the Utes took flight and left us in possession of the battle field and about 250 horses.

"A council of war was held and we decided to move our wounded men and force to Rangely, and being but a few miles from the Utah line, would await orders for further movements. We returned to this point, and late in the afternoon the dead and wounded were brought to camp, and given the best possible care.

"The above was the substance of the action of my battalion, Kendall and Hooper for August 25, 1887."

* * * * *

Quoting now from General Crook's report: "During the night of the 24th and 25th a heavy storm of rain and hail arose, during which the Indians started down the White River and moved about 25 miles below Wolf Creek to a point, as they believed, on the Uncompahgre Indian Reservation. Here they went into camp * * * The White River at this point makes a bend, while the bluffs run more nearly in a straight line. The 'bottom' between the foot of the bluffs and the river is covered with a thick growth of willows. The Indian camp was scattered along the edge of the willows and near the foot of the bluffs, which are here about 60 feet in height * * * They believed themselves secure; no sentinels or runners were guarding the approaches to the camp and the whites attained a position on the bluffs without alarming the Indians. Kendall's party at once opened fire. The surprise was complete. The Indians took refuge in the brush, and returned the fire for about three and a half hours, covering in this way the removal of their wounded and the women and children. Late in the afternoon they fell back, the whites soon after withdrawing to Rangeley. * * *"⁴

On arriving at Rangely Major Leslie immediately entrenched his camp and prepared for an attack. Lieutenant F. Folson, Company F, 1st Infantry, Colo. N. G., had been wounded in the stomach on the 25th, died on the night of the 26th, and with deputy Ward was buried in the field with military

⁴ This account of the fight differs in all material facts from that of Major Leslie's. Although written by General Crook, who was not present at the fight, it is, as admitted by Lieutenant Burnett and who gave it to General Crook, the Indians account of the affair. I have interviewed some of the participants in the fight and the consensus of opinion is that Major Leslie's account is the correct one.—J. H. N.

honors. Private E. T. Goshon, Troop C, a recruit enlisted at Glenwood Springs, left his troop about this time and, against orders, tried to run off some horses. Apparently the Utes were on the alert and on August 29th Goshon's dead body was found several miles from camp. He had been shot through the lungs, and his horse killed and lying near him.

The Indian losses in the fight of the 25th were never accurately determined—Major Leslie reported eight men killed and six wounded; unofficial accounts placed the losses much higher, and General Reardon reported that he had been informed that two Indians and a colored trooper of the 9th U. S. Cavalry had, on separate occasions, stated the Indian losses to have been fifteen killed on the day of the battle, one dying since, and five badly wounded. The news of the fight, when it reached the Agency in Utah, caused the wildest excitement and had it not been for the restraining influence of Agent Byrnes, Interpreter Curtis, and Lieutenant Burnett, 9th Cavalry, there is no doubt that Leslie's command at Rangely would have been attacked by an overwhelming force of Indians. Fortunately the three officials, backed up by a troop of 9th U. S. Cavalry, were successful in inducing the Indians, including Colorow and his band, to return to the reservation where they arrived August 27th.

The situation at this time, as gleaned from Brigadier General Reardon's final report, was as follows:

"At 10 o'clock A. M. August 26, two couriers arrived at Rangely, from a detachment of colored troops, from Fort Duchesne, under a flag of truce, and Major Leslie with an escort of two, returned with them to or near the reservation, some 14 miles from Rangely with written instruction from Sheriff Kendall, that all he desired was the bodies of three Utes (naming them), and that them he must and would have.

"The officer in command of the detachment stated that there were from four hundred to six hundred Utes just across the line, that an attack would be



TROOP A (PIKE'S PEAK RANGERS), FIRST SQUADRON CAVALRY, COLORADO NATIONAL GUARD
Captain William Saxton, Commanding, at Meeker, Colorado, during the Ute outbreak, August, 1887.

futile and that by evening all the Utes would be out of Colorado and that two troops of regulars from Fort Duchesne would arrive that evening at the Ute camp to maintain peace. The officer suggested that a Deputy United States Marshal go to Fort Duchesne and place the warrants for the arrest of Colorow and others, in the hands of the agent at the fort, who 'promised' to at once have said three Utes arrested and turned over to the county.

"The Utes on the twenty-sixth instant rounded up some of their stray stock in the vicinity of the battle ground, and removed it to the reservations.

"Major Leslie and Sheriff Kendall both reported, that, judging from what they had seen and heard, they were of the opinion that the Utes would again attack them and were only delaying doing so to secure a fresh supply of ammunition and rations. Acting on this view of the matter, Major Leslie made his position at Rangely as secure as circumstances would permit and dispatched to me for orders.

"He was directed to hold his position at Rangely until further orders from me and he remained there, scouting in that vicinity and reporting from day to day, 'no signs of Indians,' until Saturday, September 3, when he received orders from me to return to Meeker, where he arrived September 4, 7 o'clock P. M."

On August 29th, 1887, Governor Alva Adams accompanied by the Hon. G. C. Symes, the Hon. Wm. N. Byers, Attorney General Alvin Marsh, Adjutant General George West and Colonel S. A. Shepperd, Colo. N. G., arrived at General Reardon's headquarters in Meeker; here they were met on August 31st by Brigadier General George Crook, U. S. Army, and Agent Byrnes, for a conference on the Indian situation.

Colorow had expressed a desire to meet Governor Adams, but for some unknown reason did not present himself at the appointed time and place. General Crook agreed to place a sufficient number of United States troops between the Uintah Reservation and Colorado to restrict the Indians to their own territory, and to use his influence to prevent any more invasions upon Colorado soil.

At the conclusion of the conference orders were at once issued for the withdrawal of the state troops, and on September 3rd as stated in General Reardon's report, Major Leslie started his march back to the railhead at Gypsum, arriving there on September 10th after a two days halt at Meeker to recuperate. Meantime Company F, 1st Infantry, of Aspen, had returned to its home station on September 2nd. All remaining troops accompanied Major Leslie's command to Gypsum and here they entrained on the 10th for their respective home stations, arriving thereat—Troop B, Leadville, on the same day; and Company H, 2nd Infantry, Canon City, Troop A, Colorado Springs, and Troop C, Denver, on September 11th. Thus ended the White River Expedition of 1887.

The conduct of the Colorado troops during the campaign had been above reproach, and it is well in this connection to quote the following from the report on the campaign made by Adjutant General George West to the Governor:

"At this time I desire to commend, in the highest terms of praise, the officers and men composing the detail for duty in aid of the authorities of Garfield county, for the promptness and energy⁵ displayed by one and all,

⁵ This phrase, "Promptness and Energy" afterwards became the motto of the 1st Separate Squadron 117th Cavalry, Colorado N. G.

as well as for their soldierly qualities exhibited during the entire campaign. As none of the troops are permanently mounted or furnished with many things essential to mounted men, the work accomplished in so short a time by them seems little less than miraculous. It could not have been done had they not been possessed of that earnest endeavor and patriotic desire inherent in the American citizen-soldier to do his whole duty to the state, and in this instance to rescue the almost defenseless women and children of that county from the horrors of an Indian war."

It has been urged in defense of Colorow in official reports and other documents that he at no time desired to fight nor engage in war with the whites; this is rather contradictory to a statement made by General Crook in his official report on the outbreak to the effect that, "They (the reservation Indians) had on one occasion sent a delegation of some of their head men to Colorow on a mission the object of which was to prevent him from engaging in hostilities." If Colorow, as alleged, did not want to fight, why was it necessary to send a delegation to dissuade him from engaging in hostilities? Colorow had no legal right to be absent from the reservation in Utah, and he knew it. Furthermore he was well aware that sooner or later his depredations and annoyances would cause a clash, but he made no effort to avoid the clash. It was manifestly the duty of the general government to have compelled his return to the reservation when his escape therefrom was known; however, this was not done, and the consequences of that neglect were the outbreak of 1887, and a cost to the State of Colorado of \$80,314.72. However, to make a final quotation from Governor Adams report; "If the expedition into Garfield county saved the wife or daughter of a single settler from ravishment; if it preserved a single life, be it child or man, the State but performed its duty, and in this received full compensation for every cost."

Colorow died at his camp at the mouth of the White River near the Uintah Reservation, Utah, December 11, 1888; and his own people were agreed with the white men, "that", to quote Smiley, "it was the only praiseworthy thing he ever did."